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Introduction 
Communication via social media and other multimedia channels play a prominent role in the political 
arena. One look at the activities on media like Twitter of politicians and their frequent presence on 
television confirm this statement. Considering the fact that political preferences are shaped by the 
communication of political representatives via social media channels and television (Disch, 2011, 100), 
political representatives can potentially dominate and have great influence on people’s opinions, ideas 
and their positions in society. The strategy of creating images and narratives, values and ideas in order 
to win popularity is more than ever part of the political game. Politicians posting stirring tweets, framing 
social groups and identities are part of the daily practice of modern politics. Simultaneously we see a 
shift  to a society that Bernand Manin terms an ‘audience democracy’ (Manin, 1997, 211). It is 
characterised by the “personalisation of power” meaning that the personality and charismatic 
characteristics of  politicians are more leading  in elections than values of parties. Because voters base 
their choices more on the personality of politicians and less on stable values, voting behaviour is exposed 
to changes.  Pollsters and media strategies have become an essential part of doing politics (Disch, 2019, 
11). A second development we see in modern societies is the rise of unelected representatives. 
Individuals or NGO’s claim to represent social groups without being appointed by those they claim to 
represent. An often used example is the U2 singer Bono who claims to represent the interests of the 
people in Africa. Without formal legitimacy, unelected representatives nevertheless may influence 
decision making processes on policies. These features of modern democratic societies stress the 
importance of the question concerning the duties and responsibilities of the political representative. They 
ask for a set of normative rules for democratic representation taking into account that the new 
communication strategies enlarge the capacity of the representative to influence people’s opinions. Do 
we consider it representation when a representative shapes the opinion of the represented in such a way 
that it fits his own agenda? Do we consider it representation when he creates narratives to awake 
sentiments that may not have been prevalent before? Or is that no longer representation but rather 
manipulation and a form of dictatorship? In short, what are the duties and the role of the political 
representative in the audience democracy?  
Hanna Pitkin, one of the most influential authors in the debate on political representation, has been 
thoroughly engaged in this question. For a long time the debate on political representation evolved 
around the following controversy: should a representative do exactly the same as what the represented 
would have done in a similar situation? Or should a representative be more free to act on the basis of his 
interpretation of what is best for his constituents? Pitkin argues a representative should represent both 
interests and wishes by responsive to the represented. The representative should act in the interest of his 
constituents and he should take the wishes of the represented into account. The representative should do 
this in a way the represented do not object to what is done in their name ( Pitkin, 1967, 209). By being 
responsive to the represented, the representative makes the represented “making present again” (Pitkin, 
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1967, 8). According to Pitkin, making present again is the core definition of representation.  
Responsiveness as the answer to the question of the duties of the political representative has been both 
defended and criticized a lot. Also, her account gave rise to what is called the “standard account” of 
political representation. The standard account assumes people to have pre-existing interests and wishes. 
It implies that these interests and wishes exist a priori and that these can be expressed and are ready to 
be represented before representation takes place. For both Pitkin and the standard account, whether a 
representative has represented well or badly should be assessed along the line of the question whether 
the thing represented is made present again.  Critique against Pitkin and the standard account of political 
representation comes from the constructivist turn in political representation. According to the 
constructivist turn, responsiveness requires people to have pre-existing interests and wishes. 
Constructivist authors claim that when we look at the political reality, we see that people do not have 
pre-existing and readily available interests and wishes. According to them, these interests become 
constructed in the process of representation. The construction takes place through a communicative, 
performative process and involves the creation of the characteristics, interests, wishes, identities of both 
representative and represented. To clarify the constructivist process of representation, let us look at an 
imaginary political debate on new legislation on agricultural policy. In this debate a politician claims to 
represent the interests of small ecological farmers. Elections are coming up and the representative wants 
to build up his reputation as the representative for small farmers. So he puts forward a narrative saying 
that the small farmers have interest x and y. Because of the representative’s action the farmers might be 
convinced of him being the right representative for them. Before the politician’s claim, the ecological 
farmers may not have had a clear and unified idea of their interests regarding this specific issue. But 
because of the convincing claim of the representative, they see themselves as having interests and 
consequently conceive that politician as their representative. In a nutshell, this is how the performative 
and communicative process of representation contribute the creation of the characteristics of the 
representative and represented. The act of representation creates something new. 
This constructivist account of political representation is in line with the observation that in modern 
representative democracies the activity of shaping and influencing the public opinion has become a 
prominent part of doing politics. But beside its accurate description of political representation, what 
does the constructivist turn normatively claim about political representation? The constructivist turn 
stands for a normative challenge with regard to political representation. If there are no pre-existing 
people with interests etc., then how to judge whether a representative has represented well or badly? 
The rule of making present again does not work without pre-existing entities. What normative standard 
to handle when normatively judging representation? How to judge democratic representation when the 
normative basis is missing? Several constructivist authors have taken up this challenge and formulated 
a normative basis for democratic representation (Saward, Disch,). But how successful are these 
normative standards? Considering the fact the interests and opinions are constructed in the process of 
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political representation and considering the advanced media strategies of the political representatives, 
the representative potentially has the power to dominate people and undermine democracy. The 
constructivist normative standard should be able to address this question. In this thesis I will critically 
examine the normative account of the constructivist approach on political representation to judge if it 
succeeds in providing normative claims about the role of the political representative in a representative 
democracy. The research questions is as follows: what, if anything, does the constructivist account of 
political representation normatively claim about the duties of the political representative?  
I will start my thesis with an elaboration of Hanna Pitkin’s account of political representation and her 
answer to the question of the duties of the political representative: responsiveness. Since Pitkin’s account 
is the political theory which the constructivist turn repudiates, this outlining will also help us understand 
the emergence of the constructivist turn. Further in this thesis, I will investigate two influential 
constructivist authors and their normative theory on democratic representation; Michael Saward and 
Lisa Disch. I will analyse both authors questioning what, if any, they normatively imply about the duties 
of the political representative. The first author I will address is Michael Saward. He is a fierce opponent 
of Pitkin’s notion of responsiveness. As an alternative he provides an extensive elaboration of the 
constructivist process of representation by means of the ‘representative claim’(Saward, 2010). His 
concept of the representative claim has been very influential and is often taken as the standard tool to 
analyse political representation. In this chapter I will also set out Saward’s account of democratic 
legitimacy and critically analyse it along the lines of a critique by Lisa Disch. I will conclude that 
Saward’s account fails to give clarity on the duties of the political representative. The second 
constructivist author who takes up the challenge of providing a normative standard for judging 
democratic legitimate representation is Lisa Disch. She formulates the normative standard for 
democratic representation in terms reflexivity: the degree in which a representative system encourages 
the contestation of the represented. I side with Disch’s observation that Pitkin’s account also contains a 
constructivist turn. This move by Pitkin is overlooked by Saward. I conclude that Disch’s normative 
standard is only fit for judging representative systems hence does not provide us the specifications on 
the duties of the representative we were aiming for.   
In the conclusion, I will reflect on the analysis and conclude that all three positions do not succeed in 
providing satisfying normative claims about the role and duties of the political representative in the 
modern audience democracy. The constructivist turn  does not succeed in addressing the normative 
challenge of developing a full-fledged normative account of representation that does not rest on the 
assumption of pre-existing opinions and interests. Further, I will show that we have learned two more 
lessons from this investigation. First, we have seen that Pitkin, Saward and Disch conceive of political 
representation as the outcome of a constitutive process. This holistic approach is not fit to answer the 
question about the duties of the democratic representative within that process. Pitkin’s responsiveness 
does formulate duties for the political representative but in the development of that argument she retreats 
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from the constructivist understanding of political representation. This deficiency of constructivism is 
particularly problematic when we want to use the constructivist account to as tool to reflect on the 
political practice as the constructivist turn aims for. Secondly, Pitkin, Saward and Disch surprisingly 
share an important condition for democratic representation: the capacity of the represented to judge and 
act. Despite the fact that this is not a direct answer to our research question it is an answer to the challenge 
that modern democracies pose. So here the three authors share a normative position with regard to the 
represented. The intensification of influence on the formation of ideas and opinions via social media, 
asks for the capacity of the represented to independently act and judge. The constructivist turn and Pitkin 
rightly direct a prominent place for this condition in their normative account. But in doing so they 
overlook the importance of clarity on the duties of the actors who professionalised the activity of 
influencing opinion formation: the political representative. 
 
Chapter 1 Hanna Pitkin’s making present again: responsiveness 
In this chapter I will set out Hanna Pitkin’s stance on the role and duties of the representative. In our 
investigation to the role of the democratic representative, Pitkin is an author we cannot ignore because 
her argument for the duties of the representative is very influential in the literature on political 
representation. Her core definition of representation as “making present again”   (Pitkin, 1967,8) is often 
conceived as the basic premise of the so called ‘standard account’ of democratic representation (Rehfeld 
2006, 2-3). It is important to have a clear understanding of Pitkin’s account and her influence on the 
standard account, because this is where the constructivist turn of political representation turns away 
from. To understand the core principles of the constructivist turn it is helpful to see from which basis it 
emerged. In this chapter I will provide a reading of Hanna Pitkin’s account of political representation. I 
will give a short overview of her analysis of her four views of representation. The last view conceives 
of representation as an activity. This activity entails that the representative should promote the interests 
of his constituents and that he should be responsive to their wishes. He should act in the interests of his 
constituents in such a manner that they do not object to what is done in their name. This requires that 
the constituents have the capacity to judge and object. Pitkin applies this principle to governmental 
representation. For governmental representation counts that is representing when it acts in the interests 
of the represented and is responsive to their wishes. This is what Pitkin terms the condition of 
“responsiveness” (Pitkin, 1967, 233). However, as I will argue, representation in terms of responsiveness 
is too narrow to account for the full spectrum of political representation. Also, I will show Pitkin’s core 
definition suggests an unidirectionality in the relationship between the representative and the represented 
that does not cohere with the political reality. At the end I will present the so called ‘standard account’ 
of political representation that emerged from Pitkin’s concept of representation. However, Pitkin and 
the standard account should not be considered as identical. There are some important differences that 
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contribute to the breeding ground of the development of the debate on the normative challenges in the 
constructivist turn.   
 
1.1 The Concept of Representation 
In The Concept of Representation Hanna Pitkin carries out a conceptual analysis of the concept political 
representation. In this book Pitkin aims to clear the disagreements on the meaning of representation 
(Pitkin, 1967,6). She takes up the task to investigate all the varied ways in which the word representation 
is used in practice. To explain her methodology she sketches the analogy flash-bulb photographs. Each 
photo is taken from a different angle and every photo is a partial view of the thing photographed; 
representation. To understand the meaning of representation, Pitkin claims that we must investigate all 
these different angles and put all the photographs together (Pitkin, 1967, 11).  As a starting point for this 
investigation, Pitkin looks for a “one-sentence definition of this meaning, broad enough to cover all its 
applications in various contexts”(Pitkin,1967,8). She formulates the following core definition of 
representation: “Representation, taken generally, means the making present of something which is 
nevertheless not present” (Pitkin, 1967, 8-9). In a nutshell, “re-presentation, a making present again” 
(Disch, 1967, 8). Keeping the core definition of representation in mind, Pitkin distinguishes four views 
of representation: formalistic views, symbolic representation, descriptive representation, representation 
as substantive acting for. All four  the views are a partial view of representation and each view is used 
in different applications and contexts of political representation hence not interchangeable. Considering 
our goal to learn about the duties of the political representative, I will now discuss the four views to see 
“whether that view, its assumptions and implications, really fit the case to which he is trying to apply 
them.”(Pitkin, 1967:228). Our case is the activity and duty of the political representative. All the views 
are in some sense relevant for and applicable to politics but they are not interchangeable. I will start with 
the formalistic views of representation.   
 
1.2 The four views of representation 
The formalistic views of representation come in two forms: the authorisation view and the accountability 
view. Pitkin describes the authorisation view as involving the idea that the representative is someone 
who is authorized to act. (Pitkin, 1967, 38). He gained this position because of an process where the 
constituent transfers the right to act to the representative. The authorisation process is a formal process 
existing of an arrangement between the represented and the representative with binding rules. It is only 
after the transaction of the right to act that a representative comes in the position to act in the name of 
the represented. Whatever the presentative does after he is authorized counts as representation. An 
example to clarify representation as authorisation is the procedure of elections. Elections can be seen as 
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an authorisation process that places someone in the position with a right to act. Before the elections took 
place there is no case of representation because  the transaction of the right to act from the represented 
to future the representative has not yet taken place. From the moment the representative is elected, 
everything the representative does counts as representation. So representation does not depend on what 
the representative does and what kind of activities he performs. When one asks what a representative 
should do to represent, the authorisation view cannot provide an answer. The second of the two 
formalistic views distinguished by Pitkin is the accountability view (Pitkin, 1967, 55). In this view, a 
representative is someone who is to be held accountable for his actions by the constituent. The call for 
justification by the constituent takes place after the representation. During the actual acting of the 
representative he is free to act, independently of the constituents. It is only afterwards that he is to be 
held accountable. This view faces the same problem as the authorisation view. Both the formalistic 
views cannot answer the question: what are the kinds of actions or what manner of acting is required for 
a representative to represent? To go back to the analogy of the flash-bulb photographs, the two 
formalistic views of representation focus on partial aspects of the concept of representation. To put it in 
Pitkin’s words: both the formalistic views of representation are in their own plausible but they are “just 
two pieces in an incomplete jigsaw puzzle” (Pitkin, 1967:59). Both the perspectives are incomplete 
because they focus on the formal agreements of authorisation and accountability of representation. These 
views of representation might cover in some situations the meaning of what happens during political 
representation like we saw with elections. However, Pitkin argues, political representation involves 
more than the formal representation. She claims that when we speak of political representation in the 
daily practice we also refer to various kinds of activities like bargaining and making compromises 
(Pitkin, 1967: 212). The formalistic views of representation are not able to address what happens during 
representation, the activity of representation hence the activity of the representative. The formalistic 
perspectives do not inform us about the role and duties of representative.  
We continue with two other views of representation: descriptive representation and symbolic 
representation. Pitkin continues the investigation by asking “what a presentative is and what he must be 
like to represent” (Pitkin, 1967, 59).  This approach is what Pitkin calls representation as ‘standing for’. 
The representative represents by virtue of a correspondence of characteristics or elements between the 
representative and the represented, says Pitkin (Pitkin, 1967,  61). Within the approach of ‘standing for’ 
she distinguishes two categories: descriptive representation and symbolic representation. The first of the 
two views of representation as ‘standing for’ is descriptive representation. Descriptive representation 
holds that representation is based on the correspondence, resemblance or reflection of the descriptive 
characteristics (Pitkin, 1967, 60). An example of descriptive representation is the composition of a 
government reflecting the composition of the society. A society may have the characteristic of having 
30% of the population living in urban areas and 10% of the population living in agricultural regions. A 
representative government in the descriptive sense should have a parliament where 30 % of the members 
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lives in cities and 10 % of the parliament lives in the agricultural area. Descriptive representation is 
relevant for explaining political representation as the example of the composition of the parliament 
shows. But then again, it is not “the whole story about representation” (Pitkin, 1967, 91). The view of 
descriptive representation is not fit for the goal Pitkin and we have set: defining the activities of 
representative in political representation.  
The second subcategory of ‘standing for’ distinguished by Pitkin is symbolic representation. Symbolic 
representation is based on the idea of a correspondence between the representative and the represented. 
This idea or belief is in a way shared and accepted. A symbol is the kind of representation that is purely 
based on an idea or belief (Pitkin, 1967, 92). An example of symbolic representation is a white flag 
symbolizing peace or ceasefire. The correspondence between the white flag and peace is by virtue of a 
belief in the idea of the correspondence. There are no rational reasons and no resembling characteristics 
yet there is a correspondence. Also symbolic representation cannot account for the activity of 
representation and tell us what a representative should do. So the two views of representation face the 
same problem: they cannot address the question of what a representative has to do when representing. 
However, representation as “standing for” does involve some form of activity: the activity of “making 
representations” (Pitkin, 1967, 90). Making representations is the kind of activity taking place when the 
representative gives information by representing something that is absent. Making representation is also 
the kind of activity in aesthetic representation. A painting is a representation of the artist’s view on the 
world. The artist himself makes the representation as he makes the painting. For Pitkin “making 
representations” is not crucial  for political representation. Nevertheless, it is relevant to point out 
because the activity of making representations will return in the discussion of the constructivist turn.  
The fourth and last view of representation contains the perspective on representation related to the 
question “What does a representative do? What constitutes the activity of representation?” (Pitkin, 1967, 
59). The activity of representation, is termed the “substance or content” of the activity of representation 
also known as “substantive acting for” (Pitkin, 1967: 114). The substance of representation involves the 
activity of speaking for, acting for, looking after the interests of others. We have seen the core definition 
of representation: making present again. Here the thing represented is made present by the substantive 
activity. Because this view focusses purely on the activity it lends itself very well to address the question 
of what a representative should do when representing.  “Only this concept supplies us with standards 
for judging the representative actions, for deciding whether he has represented well or ill” (Pitkin, 1967, 
142). Let us now focus on what the activity of representation entails. After that, we can formulate the 
duties for the representative that follow from it. What exactly should a representative do to act for, 
speaking for, look after the interests of others? What kind of action is required for substantive acting for 
others? The literature on political representation knows a long lasting debate on the duties of the 
representative. “Should (must) a representative do what his constituents want, and be bound by mandates 
or instructions from them; or should (must) he be free to act as seems best to him in pursuit of their 
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welfare?” (Pitkin, 1967, 145). This controversy is called the mandate-independence controversy. Pitkin 
takes the mandate-independence debate as the starting point of the development of substantive acting 
for others. The mandate conception of representation understands representation to be representing 
wishes: should a representative do what his constituents want? The representative is bound by the 
mandate and the wishes of his constituents. The representative must act in accordance with the wishes 
of his constituents even when that is disadvantageous for their interests and welfare. On the other side 
of the controversy, the independence account of representation is concerned with the representation of 
interests: in pursuit of their welfare. The representative must promote the interests of his constituents. 
He is independent of his constituents in the sense that he is not restricted by the wishes of his constituents 
and that he is free to act according his interpretation of what is best for his constituents. The controversy 
seems unsolvable because it suggests that the promotion of interests conflict with the promotion of 
wishes. However, Pitkin states that “both sides are right” (Pitkin, 1967,  154). She reasons that when a 
representative has no freedom at all to act, then we do not consider his actions as representation. When 
a person acts for someone else and thereby carries out the instructions exactly as given to him by his 
constituents, then we do not consider him as a representative either, Rather as a puppet, Pitkin says 
(Pitkin, 1967, 153). So, she concludes, a representative must have some freedom to act independently 
of his constituents. On the other hand, if a representative would  ignore the wishes of his constituents 
and act independently of them, then also we would not conceive that as representation. Then the alleged 
representative is not a representative, but just an individual acting and not taking anyone else into 
account. Also, the representative is not completely free because he is bound by restrictions imposed by 
the constituents. So the activity of representation entails both the independent promotion of interests and 
mandated action in representing wishes. This conclusion must also be understood as a deduction from 
the core definition of representation: making present again. Pitkin says that “the represented must be 
both present and not present” (Pitkin, 1967, 154). When the representative is independently acting, the 
represented is not acting or doing anything and thus is absent. When the representative is following the 
wishes of his constituents and acts like his constituents would have acted the wishes and the constituents 
are represent in the activity of representation. Thus, a representative must be free to act and promote the 
constituent’s interests and he must take the wishes into consideration. How to establish this?  
The making present of both the interests and the wishes is possible by means of ‘responsiveness’. The 
representative must promote “the interests of the represented, …, but in such a way that the represented 
does not object to what is done in his name” (Pitkin, 1967, 155). Most of the time the representative will 
succeed in doing this because, Pitkin argues, interests and wishes normally coincide. People will want 
what is in their interest. So when the representative acts for the interests of the constituents, they will 
agree. Moreover, it is the duty of the representative to act in the interests of his constituents when they 
do not have a will or wish about a certain issue (Pitkin, 1967, 163).  The condition that the representative 
must act in a way responsive to the constituent’s wishes is what Pitkin terms ‘responsiveness’. Pitkin 
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defines responsive acting as “not actually and literally act in response to the principal’s wishes, but the 
principal’s wishes must be potentially there and potentially relevant” (Pitkin, 1967, 155). But, Pitkin 
emphasizes, it will not always be the case that interests and opinions coincide. The represented might 
object to the actions of his representative. When objection arises, the representative owes his constituents 
a rational explanation. He at least has to give an explanation or justification for the discrepancy. To 
summarize the activity of the representative in terms of responsiveness I refer to a quote by Pitkin: 
"The representative must act independently: his action must involve discretion and judgment; 
he must be the one who acts. The represented must also be (conceived as) capable of independent 
action and judgment, not merely being taken care of. And, despite the resulting potential for 
conflict between representative and represented about what is to be done, that conflict must not 
normally take place. The representative must act in such a way that there is no conflict, or if it 
occurs an explanation is called for.” (Pitkin, 1967, 209-210).  
From this criterion of responsiveness follows an important condition. The representative must act in 
such a way that the represented does not object to what is done in his name. Hence it is an important 
condition that the represented are capable of judgment and action (Pitkin, 1967, 154). If not, conflict is 
not possible. Also, as Runciman notes, the capacity of the represented to object allows for him to be 
‘present’ ( Runciman, 2007, 95). So responsiveness makes the represented present again.  
In short, we have seen that substantive acting for others requires that the representative to promote the 
interests of his constituents but in a way responsive to their objections. Responsiveness means that the 
wishes have to be taken seriously and taken into consideration. But the representative does not always 
has to act according the objections and obey them. Consequently, a more fundamental condition is that 
the constituents are capable of judgment and action. When conflict occurs and the representative acts 
against the wishes of the represented, the representative is obliged to give an explanation or justification 
for this actions. Here I demonstrated representation in conceptual terms, as a principal-agent relationship 
with one representative and one represented. I now turn to Pitkin´s discussion of the application of the 
substantive view of representation and responsiveness to political representation. This will lead us to the 
possibility of judging the political representative and the representative government.  
 
1.3 Political representation and responsiveness 
Pitkin argues that substantive acting for others is applicable to and very well fit for the meaning of 
political representation because “political representation is, in fact, representation, particularly in the 
sense of ‘acting for’”(Pitkin, 1967, 224).  As we saw earlier, political reality mainly involves activities 
like bargaining, compromising and deliberation about the various interests and wishes (Pitkin, 1967,  
212). Besides political representation as an substantive activity Pitkin conceives of political 
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representation as a “public institutionalised arrangement, …. What makes it representation is not any 
single action by any one participant, but the over-all structure and functioning of the system, the patterns 
emerging from the multiple activities of many people.” (Pitkin, 1967, 221-222). Substantive acting 
involves responsiveness hence the political representative, being the public system, must act in the 
interest of the public interests and be responsive to the public opinion. In The Concept of Representation 
Pitkin focusses on “representative government” as the form of political representation.  
The conceptual argument for responsiveness formulated in terms of the principal-agent model of 
representation also counts for governmental representation. A representative government acts in the 
interests of the people and is responsive to the wishes of the people. In a representative government, the 
representative must always and continually be ready and able to respond: “a constant condition of 
responsiveness” (Pitkin 1967, 233). Also here counts the more fundamental condition that the people 
under a representative government must be able to judge and act hence be present in the representation. 
The people control the government by true action; substantive action (Pitkin, 1967, 230). It is 
representation when   the people are present in governmental action, made present by the representative 
acting independently in the interests of the represented in a way responsive to their wishes and 
objections. “A representative government must not merely be in control, not merely promote the public 
interests, but must also be responsive to the people” (Pitkin, 1967, 232). To avoid that the representative 
has too much freedom, independence and initiative to act, the people need to be in control of their 
government. When we speak of governments in a representative democracy we refer to governments 
where the people have control over what the government does. “It seems to me that we showed a 
government to be representative not by demonstrating its control over its subjects but just the reverse, 
by demonstrating that its subjects have control over what it does” (Pitkin, 1967, 232).  
The securement of the constant condition of responsiveness and the capacity of the citizens to judge and 
act requires institutions, according to Pitkin. Responsiveness must be ensured in a systematic, 
institutional and prevalent procedure. The institutionalisation of the conditions of the representative 
government takes place through free and fair elections. So, a representative government is representative 
only when there are elections to secure responsiveness. This is an important move in the analysis of 
Pitkin. She intertwines democracy and political representation. The criterion for political representation, 
responsiveness, is met by elections. This implies that Pitkin understands political representation by 
means of formal institutions, arrangement related to governmental representation. “Representative 
government is not defined by particular actions at a particular moment, but by long-term systematic 
arrangements- by institutions and the way in which they function.” ( Pitkin, 1967, 234). Also it implies 
that only the elected representative can be democratic legitimate and that a representative is per 
definition a democratic legitimate representative. The pulling together of democracy and representation 
and the implications that follow from them receive criticism. Two of those critics are Andrew Rehfeld 
and Laura Montanaro. Andrew Rehfeld (2006) argues for a ‘general theory of political representation’ 
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that includes also nondemocratic representatives. He points out that on the global stage, there many 
people who operate as representatives though are not elected. For example, in the United Nations where 
an individual represents the interests of his country but is not elected. Rehfeld argues that Pitkin’s 
account of political representation cannot explain the non-elected form of representation because her 
account of political representation relies on institutions (that are supposed to secure democratic 
legitimate representation). Pitkin’s conditions for representation are simultaneously the criteria for 
democratic legitimate representation. So a representative is only representative when it is also a 
democratic legitimate representative. And as Rehfeld shows, the political reality knows a distinction 
between the democratic representative, like the elected politicians, and the nondemocratic 
representative, the representative in the UN. “By simultaneously defining conditions by which someone 
becomes a political representative and the conditions for her legitimacy we are unable to explain the 
cases of illegitimate representation I illustrated above arise.” (Rehfeld, 2006, 3). The second critic of 
Pitkin related to the claim that a representative is per definition a democratic legitimate representative 
is Laura Montanaro (2007). Also she argues that “We must broaden our understanding of representation 
so that we can recognize it when it occurs beyond government institutions and develop criteria that 
enable us to assess it” (Montanaro, 2007, 7). According to her, political representation includes also 
“self-appointed representatives” (Montanaro, 2007, 2). Similar to Rehfeld’s nondemocratic 
representatives, self-appointed representatives are unelected representatives that effectively claim to 
represent. One of the examples Montanaro uses is the NGO Oxfam. Can’t Oxfam be representative 
because it is an unelected institution? Like Rehfeld, Montanaro argues that nonelected representatives 
also can be representative.   
I agree with both Rehfeld and Montanaro that Pitkin’s notion of political representation is focused too 
much on political representation as a formal and electoral processes. Moreover, she is vague on this 
matter. On the one hand she writes that political representation is very broad and varied (Pitkin, 1967, 
227-228). Also, posing representative government as one of the expressions of political representation 
suggest that there are more forms of political representation. However, she does not elaborate on those 
other forms. The absence of this elaboration gives me and her critics to think that she does not conceive 
of political representation any other than governmental representation. This presumption is strengthened 
by the comment she makes directly after the introduction of her definition of political representation as 
an institutionalised arrangement. She says that the institutionalised arrangement “is representation if the 
people (or a constituency) are present in governmental action.” (Pitkin, 1967, 222).  The broadening of 
political representation is also an important turn in the research question. We have arrived at the claim 
that the political representative should not only be understood as the elected representative but also as 
the unelected representative. The question that follow is how to distinguish between the democratic self-
appointed representatives and nondemocratic self-appointed representatives without necessarily relying 
on elections. In the next two chapters we will look into this question along the lines of the constructivist 
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thinkers Michael Saward and Lisa Disch. Moreover, even when we understand political representation 
to entail both elected and nonelected representation, the question remains whether responsiveness as a 
normative standard succeeds. Critics, among them Samuel Hayat, argue that Pitkin’s core definition of 
representation assumes pre-existing interests and wishes. Pitkin emphasizes that “the represented must 
be somehow logically prior” ( Pitkin, 1967, 140). Hayat claims: “This definition rests upon the idea that 
something (the people, a social group or an institution) exists before its representation and that the act 
of representation is a certain way of making this something present again.”(Hayat, 2019, 122). 
Responsiveness as the normative standard is the process that secures the presence of the pre-existing 
thing that was absent. The approach of representation in terms of presence is referred to by Young as 
the “metaphysics of presence” ( Young, 2000, 126). Representation here is understood as a relationship 
in terms of the presence of the represented. I agree with Pitkin’s critics that this does not rhyme with the 
political reality. In the introduction we observed that interests take shape in the communicative process 
of politics and are no pre-existing entities. Pitkin’s metaphysics of presence does not cohere the political 
reality. Later in the discussion of Disch, we will elaborate more on this unidirectionality and learn that 
Pitkin also knows a constructivist turn. 
To conclude, we have set out Pitkin’s analysis of the four views of representation and their relevance to 
political representation. Only the fourth view can address the activity actually taking place in political 
representation: substantive acting for others. The normative standard for representation is 
responsiveness. A representative government should act in the interests of his constituents and be 
responsive to their wishes. This way the subjects are in control of their government. Acting in the 
interests of and being responsive to the constituents is required for the representative government as a 
public system but also counts for the individual representative within that system. What then is the role 
of the individual representative in this representative system? The acts of the individual representative 
take place in the institutionalised system of political representation and only within that system his 
actions, in the sense of acting for, count as political representation. So, according to Pitkin, the individual 
representative must act in the interests of his constituents in a manner responsive to them but it requires 
an embeddedness in an institutionalised system. But I sided with Refheld’s and Montanaro’s argument 
that political representation should cover a broader spectrum of activities also outside governmental 
institutions hence the criteria of responsiveness are not sufficient to answer the question of what the role 
and duties are of the political representative. Moreover, Pitkin’s metaphysics of presence in her core 
definition and responsiveness assume pre-existing interests and wishes while in the political reality we 
see the contrary.  
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1.4 The standard account of political representation 
Pitkin’s work on representation is often taken as a standard for thinking about representation. Some of 
the premises and principles of Pitkin’s account of representation form the basis of what is called ‘the 
standard account’ of representation (Rehfeld, 2006, 3). “Pitkin’s work quickly became the point of 
departure for anyone writing on the topic, whether in political theory or elsewhere in the field, and has 
shaped the debate ever since it was published.” (Rehfeld, 2006, 3). I will shortly give an overview of 
the standard account and of the elements it adopted from Pitkin. Authors like Rehfeld would consider 
this exercise as unnecessary because they argue that Hanna Pitkin’s thinking is the standard account. 
But I think it is useful to isolate the assumptions adopted by the standard account, because it are these 
premises and principles that form the breeding ground from which the constructivist turn emerges. 
Moreover, it is relevant to make this distinction because later we will see that the reading of Pitkin as 
equal to the standard account leads to a simplification that overlooks important nuances made by Pitkin. 
The standard account of representation is firstly and fundamentally grounded in the idea that something 
exists before the representation. Representation “echo’s, reproduces or tracks”(Disch, 2019,  3) the pre-
existing with pre-existing elements or characteristics. The representative must make these elements 
present by looking out for them and acting for them. This idea is strongly related to what Hayat terms 
“representation as composition”: a legitimate government is a composition of elements that exist in the 
people (Hayat, 2019, 122).  Here we see the core definition of representation by Pitkin at work: “making 
present again… the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present 
literally or in fact” (Pitkin, 1967, 8-9).  The second characteristic of the standard account of democratic 
representation is an unidirectional principal-agent relationship (Castiglione, Warren 2019, 21). This 
relationship is typically understood as an unidirectional relationship in terms of responsiveness. “The 
represented must be somehow logically prior; the representative must be responsive to him rather than 
the other way around.”(Pitkin, 1967, 140). The standard account also contains the idea that the 
delegation of the authority to act takes place through the procedural standards of authorisation and 
accountability (Rehfeld, 2006, 3). This we also saw in the discussion of Pitkin’s analysis of the 
representative government. The procedures are free and fair elections. Consequently, the conditions of 
the standard account of representation are simultaneously the conditions of normative legitimacy, as 
Rehfeld points out. The criteria of political representation are “simultaneously defining conditions by 
which someone becomes a political representative and the conditions for her legitimacy.” (Rehfeld, 
2006, 3). We can see some overlap in some of the principles and assumptions of Pitkin’s analysis and 
the standard account of political representation. However, there are also important differences. Some of 
Pitkin’s claims are overlooked or wrongly interpreted by understanding Pitkin as the standard account. 
Especially Rehfeld’s reading misses nuances with regard to Pitkin’s conception of political 
representation. The unidirectionality of Pitkin’s conception of political representation is the elements 
that has been simplified a lot. The principles of representation as making present again is taken to be 
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the one and only core definition. That is partly true. But Rehfeld fixates so much on the unidirectionality 
of that  definition that he does not pay attention to the nuances Pitkin makes when she switches from the 
discussion of representation in the conceptual form of a principal-agent relationship to political 
representation. Her discussion of the national unity very well shows that she sees that the relationship 
between representative and represented in political representation not purely as unidirectional. When 
discussing political representation, Pitkin addresses the question whether it is the representative’s should 
pursue the particular interests of his constituents or should pursue the interests of the nation as a whole. 
Here she makes an important claim proving that she is not so tied to the unidirectionality of her core 
definition as the standard account is. Pitkin argues that “The national unity… is not merely presupposed 
by representation; it is also continually re-created by the representatives’ activities” (Pitkin, 1967, 218). 
This move away from the unidirectional principal-agent relationship, is very important but 
systematically overlooked by the standard account. It also creates a contradiction in Pitkin’s theory on 
representation. On the one hand, based on the core definition making present again, responsiveness 
requires pre-existing interests and wishes. On the other hand, we just saw in the previous quote that 
political representation does not requires pre-existing entities but that political representation contributes 
to the creation of the thing represented as in the example of the national unity. How should this be 
explained? There is a distinction between the construction of the thing represented and political 
representation itself as a construction. Pitkin argues for the latter with her constructivist idea of national 
unity. But she is also committed to the first claim, as a derivate from representation as making present 
again. In chapter three we will elaborate more on the tension between these two claims in Pitkin’s 
account of political representation. In the following two chapters, we will see that the distinction 
between the ‘standard account’ reading of Pitkin and the nuanced reading of Pitkin is the dividing line 
along which the debate between Saward and Disch takes shape. In the next chapter we will discuss 
Michael Saward, a constructivist author who interprets and repudiates Pitkin along the lines of the 
standard account of political representation.  
 
Chapter 2 The representative claim and democratic representation : a critique 
In our search for normative claims about the role and responsibility of the political representative I have 
addressed Pitkin’s approach on democratic legitimacy. Now we have arrived at the second stance in this 
debate: the constructivist turn in political representation by Michael Saward. His work in The 
Representative Claim provides an extensive elaboration of the constructivist process of political 
representation. We will need a clear understanding of the representative claim approach and its 
implications for democratically legitimate representation in order to address the research question.. 
Michael Saward expresses a break with the standard account of representation and with Hanna Pitkin in 
particular. I will first set out the goal of Saward’s project of the representative claim. Secondly, I will 
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set out the elements and the working of the representative claim. Next, I will outline Saward’s 
conception of democratically legitimate representation. After this discussion I will analyse what, if any, 
implications follow for the representative. Along the lines of a critique by Lisa Disch, I’ll try to formulate 
normative claims about the role of the representative compatible with Saward’s constructivism. I will 
conclude that they are not because Saward’s argument for democratic representation contains an 
inconsistency that undermines his constructivist epistemology. 
 
2.1 The representative claim 
Michael Saward breaks with the standard account of political representation. He conceives of Hanna 
Pitkin’s analysis as the essence of the standard account of representation. “Major gaps in Pitkin’s 
reasoning are major gaps in thinking about this crucial concept more generally.” (Saward, 2010, 10). He 
takes Pitkin to be claiming, that representation is a purely unidirectional model: the representative makes 
the represented present again through acting for the interests and wishes of the represented. It assumes 
activity only by the representative in acting for the pre-existing interests of the represented. Saward 
argues that this alleged unidirectionality “encourages us to ignore the subtle and deeper processes of 
constructing the represented or that which needs to be represented.” (Saward, 2010, 10). Saward 
conceives of representation as a constructivist concept in two ways: representation is constitutive of the 
represented and representation itself is constituted. In its most basic form Saward explains representation 
as the following: “A represents B. But what B is as an electoral construction can be topic of debate. How 
to characterize B ?”. Saward continues “A must portray B, and adjust himself or herself to some selective 
version of B, an activity that goes to the very heart of political representation. A can only represent B 
by constructing a contestable “B” (Saward, 2010,16). Here we clearly see how the representative is 
constitutive  of the represented. Also, this explanation of the political process contains the specific 
activity of making symbols. The representative makes a representation of himself and the constituents. 
We have seen this kind of representation in Pitkin’s discussion of representation as standing for. 
Representation as ‘standing for’ knowing two categories: descriptive representation and symbolic 
representation. Descriptive and symbolic representation also consists of the same activity as Saward’s 
political representation: making representations. Pitkin detects this kind of activity of representation in 
art and in how maps represents the reality. But Pitkin understands these views  not as the right fit for the 
activity of political representation and relevant for democratic representation. Saward finds this 
problematic. He criticizes Pitkin for separating representation as active symbolic making and 
representation as substantive acting for, whereby only the latter is relevant for democratic representation. 
Saward understands symbolic, aesthetic and descriptive representation to be “at the very heart of 
political representation”. The symbolic and substantive are not separable” (Saward, 2010,  13). So 
according to Saward, Pitkin ignores the constitutive and symbolic elements in representation because 
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she considers those views of representation to be irrelevant for political representation. Saward want to 
merge these two different categories of representation. What follows is the assumption that the 
represented as political subject and its identity, wishes and interests are not pre-existing to and 
independent of representation but representation constructs them.  
Saward sides with the critique by Rehfeld that Pitkin’s view of political representation is per definition 
a normative conception. Saward claims that “framing research into representation as primarily 
normative can also bear unduly restrictive consequences.” (Saward, 2010: 15). Restrictive in the sense 
that Pitkin understands political representation only in the form of formal governmental institutions. 
According to Saward, political representation also involves representation outside these formal 
institutions like NGO’s, head of a citizen initiatives, local sport clubs committee. By merging symbolic, 
aesthetic and descriptive representation with representation as substantive acting, Saward aims to enable 
a way of looking at political representation as something more than just formal representation and as 
constitutive.  
To reformulation and broaden the definition of political representation, Saward introduces the analytical 
tool the “representative claim”. The representative claim is the cornerstone of Saward’s account of 
political representation. Saward is convinced that this new approach will enable us to address the current 
problems of political life, both descriptively and normatively.  What does the representative claim 
consist of? Before I try to answer this question, I think it is important to emphasize that the representative 
claim is an event in the form of a claim that someone or something makes as opposed to representation 
as in terms of presence. Representative is not a characteristic that can be attached to a person or 
institution as a static fact but it is a designation for the process of claim-making. Now let us look into 
the representative claim. The standard form consists of five elements and is as follows: “A maker of 
representations puts forward a subject which stands for an object that is related to a referent and is 
offered to an audience”(Saward, 2010, 37). The subject is the representative and often coincides with 
the maker of the claim. The object is an idea or selective portrayal of a referent. For example: a famous 
actor (maker) portrays himself as an engaged father and as the right person (subject) to speak for 
teenagers in Europe who do not have access to education because of social-economic circumstances but 
who, according to the famous actor, want to go to school but cannot realise that on their own (object). 
He directs his claim to his fans in Europe (audience). The referent is the group of the flesh-and-blood 
European children out of which the maker made the selective portrayal, the object: those who want to 
go to school but cannot and need help. Representation is a continuous and dynamic process between 
these five elements. It is a circular process of making claims, accepting claims, rejecting and countering 
claims. I take the above mentioned example to demonstrate how the circular constitutive process could 
take place.  
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The famous actor presents himself as an engaged father. He creates a portrayal of himself as the subject 
standing for an object. The actor not only claims something about himself.  He also  makes a claim about 
the wishes, interests and identity of the teenagers who cannot go to school. He portrays the teenagers as 
having the wish to go to school but unable to realise that wish. As we have seen, this portrayal of the 
teenagers is the object and is put forward by the maker, the famous actor, of the claim. The famous actor 
might or might not be accepted by the possible constituency as representative and the portrayal of the 
group teenagers might or might not be accepted by them as constituency. Next, we have the object or 
the constituency, in this case the European school-deprived teenagers. The object is a selective portrayal 
of the referent. The referent is the group of flesh-and-blood teenagers who do not have access to 
education. The selective portrayal of this referent, made by the famous actor, is that they want to go to 
school and need help. This is the object hence the constituency. Saward divides the constituency in two 
groups: the intended constituency and the actual constituency (Saward, 2010, 49). The intended 
constituency is the group which the representative claims to represent. The actual constituency is the 
group of people who actually see or recognize themselves as represented. In the case of our example, 
the intended constituency is the group of teenagers who cannot go to school but want to, because that is 
the group the famous actor claims to speak for. But the question is whether the intended constituency 
becomes the actual constituency. Whether people are the intended or the actual constituency is 
dependent on if and how a constituency receives and accepts the claim. The first step for the teenagers 
as the intended constituency is that the teenagers can or cannot receive the claim. It might be possible, 
for example, that most of them do not have access to the channels used by the actor. If the intended 
constituency does not receive the claim, it cannot judge and as such cannot become the actual 
constituency. Secondly, when the intended constituency receives the claim, they can recognize it as such 
and reject or accept it. If they accept it because they recognize themselves in the claim, then that group 
is the actual constituency being represented by the representative. The object or intended constituency 
can also reject the famous actor as their representative. When the subject put forward by the famous 
actor is rejected, the actor might want to change his image and adapt. When they accept the claim, then 
the group of teenagers portrayed as by the actor comes into existence as a political subject. Being a 
political subject means being a group that recognizes itself as a unity. Of course, before the claim there 
were teenagers who could not go to school. But these teenagers might never recognized in themselves 
the wish to go to school (because no one in their environment encouraged them) and never realised that 
they could not handle that on their own. The claim might have induced a feeling or sentiment that was 
already there but had never been expressed that clearly nor awakened. Teenagers see and recognize 
themselves in that portrayal of the claim. And because of that they become an unity with a shared identity 
and common interest which can be expressed by them as one group, one political actor. “It is because 
the representative exists, because he represents ( symbolic action), that the group that is represented and 
symbolised exists and that in return gives existence to its representative as the representative of a group” 
(Saward, 2010, 51).   
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Next, there is the audience. The audience, the European fans, may or may not have received the claim. 
If they receive the claim, they can also reject or accept it and make counterclaims about themselves as 
the audience. The fans may receive the claim but reject the famous actor as the representative for the 
teenagers or reject it because they do not regard themselves as the right audience. The fans may think 
‘why not go to government  on education of the European Union?’ The way the audience reacts to the 
claim also affects the approach of the actor and contributes to the images of the actor. And in his turn 
the actor influences the audience because the claim  provokes the audience to give a reaction about itself 
as an audience. Next to the influence of the audience on the maker, the audience is also of great 
importance for the object, the teenagers. The audience can contribute to the degree in which the claim 
reaches the targeted teenagers and thus contributing to the acceptance or rejection of the claim.  In short, 
we have seen how the process of political representation works. In the representative claim we clearly 
see a constitutive agency. The subject, object and audience become constituted in the process of making, 
rejecting and accepting a claim. I hope to have demonstrated somewhat simplified how the 
representative claim works and to have provided a basic understanding of the representation process. 
There are many more details and variations to consider, but for now I hope to have provided a basis  to 
continue and tackle the normative question of democratically legitimate representation.  
 
2.2 Democratic principles 
This thesis is about democratic representation and the role and responsibilities of the representative in 
democratic representation. The elaboration of the representative claim learned us that Saward conceives 
of representation as a claim making process. Not as the reflection or composition of elements pre-
existing in the thing represented. As we saw with Pitkin, representation is democratic when the 
representative make the interests and wishes of the people present. The constructivist turn questions 
these kinds pre-existing elements and simultaneously deprives itself of the normative criterion of 
representation: making present the elements of the thing prior to the representation. Now how to assess 
and determine good and democratic representation? Saward stands for a normative challenge. In the 
remaining part of this chapter we will investigate how he responds to this challenge and whether he 
succeeds in providing an alternative normative account. In this paragraph I will focus on the 
representative claim in relation to democratic principles. First I will deal with the question of what makes 
a claim convincing enough to be accepted as democratic? Secondly, when answering these questions 
we will discover that Saward relies on a set of democratically desirable principles. Lastly, I will examine 
how the democratic principles and the criteria in accordance with the principles can be assessed and 
how these relate to the representative claim and democratically legitimate representation.    
Along the lines of Saward’s constructivism this means that we have to investigate this on the basis of 
the representative claim. So what makes a representative claim such that we accept it as democratic? 
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What gives a claim strength in the sense that we can be convinced of its representation being democratic?  
(Saward, 2009, 2). In the previous discussion we saw that it is the constituency who does or does not 
accept the claim. In the discussion about democratic principles and the representative claim, Saward 
speaks of representative claims having ‘democratic acceptability’ instead of a representative being 
democratic. The conventional answer to the question of the democratic strength of representation is 
based on elections. That is because elections enact democratic principles. (Saward, 2009,.4). If a 
representative claim meets one or more of these democratic principles, the acceptability of the claim as 
democratic increases. An important argument made by Saward in the article “Authorisation and 
Authenticity: Representation and the unelected” is that also representative claims made from non-elected 
positions can enact these principles desired for democracy: “non-elective representative claims can enact 
principles that also figure heavily with regard to elections … Why do we sometimes listen to their 
claims? Often, it is because key principles that we understand as being core to elections can- in varied 
ways- be realised by unelected actors” (Saward, 2009, 8). So a representative claim derives its 
democratic acceptability from the degree in which it can enact democratic principles. The probability 
that the claim will be accepted as democratic is bigger. Saward lists a number of principles: choice, 
consent, identification, all-affectedness, control and accountability (Saward, 2009, 4). In elections we 
can see clearly how democratic principles like choice and consent are enacted. For non-elective 
representative claims it is not so clear how the claims enact the democratic principles. 
To evaluate non-elective representative claims for their democratic acceptability Saward formulates 
three criteria with which he assesses unelected political representatives (Saward, 2009, 2). When the 
democratic principles have been enacted, the claim is democratically acceptable. Saward places the 
criteria in three different categories. The criteria can be tested along the lines of questions drawn up by 
Saward. The first category consists of the ‘connecting criteria’. These criteria focus on the positioning 
of the maker of the claim that connects him to democratic institutions. A position within such a 
democratic structure contributes to the democratic strength of a representative and its claim. The 
questions with which these criterion can be assessed are the following. “Does the claimant occupy an 
appropriate position in the line of democratic delegation? Is the claim acceptable because it is embedded 
in a larger democratic system? Locked into networks?”(Saward, 2009,16-17) The second category of 
criteria are the  ‘confirming criteria’. Here the focus is on the question whether constituencies do and 
can accept the claim in a way that gives the claims some democratic credibility. “Can the representative 
claim be tested in principles? Is the claim accepted, or provisionally acceptable?”(Saward, 2009, 18). 
The last of the three criteria are the ‘criteria of untaintedness’ and focus on claims which are deliberately 
independent of governmental institutions. Contrary to the connecting criteria, claims that meet the 
criteria of untaintedness derive their democratic strength from being independent of state or government 
institutions. (Saward 2008, 15-20) 
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Thus, these are the criteria against which a non-elective representative claim can be assessed for its 
democratic acceptability. With these criteria we are supposed to be able to detect the democratic 
principles which contribute to the democratic strength of claim and the degree of acceptability. Later we 
will see the importance of the act of acceptance of the representative claim by the constituency for the 
democratic legitimacy of a claim.  At the beginning of this chapter we saw how a representative claim 
works in general. Since this thesis about democratic representation, we examined Saward’s response to 
the normative challenge and questioned what a representative claim should look like to be accepted as 
democratic by its constituency and all the other observers of this claim. We have seen that Saward bases 
the democratic acceptability of a claim on democratically desirable principles. Elective representative 
claims are acceptable as democratic because elections enact democratic principles. The democratic 
acceptability of a  non-elective representative claim can be evaluated by the three criteria. However, a 
representative claim being democratically acceptable does not automatically mean that the claim is 
indeed democratically legitimate. According to Saward, the democratic legitimacy of the representative 
claim depends on the actual acceptance by the constituency affected by the claim.  
 
2.3 Democratic legitimacy: the constituency as the ultimate judge  
Now that we have discussed political representation in terms of the representative claim and the matter 
of democratic principles, we can continue to the discussion on democratically legitimate representation. 
In this paragraph, I will set out Saward’s account of democratically legitimate representation. Put 
simply, Saward argues that a representative claim is democratically legitimate when the claim is 
perceived as such by the constituency (Saward, 2010, 144). The constituency is the ultimate judge to 
determine democratic representation. Democratic legitimacy arises from an open-ended and continuous 
process. The judgment whether a claim or institution is democratically legitimate is always provisional. 
So legitimacy itself is constructed by the perception of those involved and is provisional and temporal. 
According to Saward, the citizen is the ultimate judge of democratic legitimacy and not the theorists 
who assesses representation against a normative standard.  It is about whether the constituency judges a 
claim as democratic and not about whether a claim meets a priori criteria drawn up by the theorist. 
However, that does not imply that any accepted claim is democratically legitimate. The conditions in 
which the representative claim is judged are also relevant for the democratic legitimacy of 
representation. Saward summarises his account of democratic legitimacy as follows: “provisionally 
acceptable claims to democratic legitimacy across society are those for which there is evidence of 
sufficient acceptance of claims by appropriate constituencies under reasonable conditions of judgment” 
(Saward, 2010, 145). I will address three important elements of this definition: the appropriate 
constituency, evidence of acceptance, and reasonable conditions of judgment. Throughout the 
discussion of these three I will try to make a clear distinction between the role of the constituency as the 
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ultimate judge and the role of theorists as the observer who can observe and recognize a democratic 
claim. We will see that these two role conflict. 
It is the judgment of the constituency that ultimately counts for the democratic legitimacy of a 
representative claim. Who exactly are in that constituency? Saward argues that the judgment of the 
intended constituency and the actual constituency is defining. Saward calls this group the appropriate 
constituency (Saward, 2010, 148). The intended constituency is the group of citizens the maker of the 
claim aims to speak for. In  case of the earlier used example the intended constituency is the group of 
teenagers in Europe who want to go to school but cannot. The actual constituency covers all the people 
who actually recognize themselves in the claim by the famous actor. The teenagers who recognize 
themselves as represented can cover a smaller group than the intended constituency. Instead of that all 
the European teenagers who do not have access to school feel represented, only South European 
teenagers recognize themselves in the claim. Then the actual constituency is smaller than the intended 
constituency. Also the actual constituency can be bigger than the intended. Not only European teenagers, 
but also dropouts in North America recognize themselves in the image put forward by the famous actor 
and feel represented by the famous actor. The intended plus the actual constituency is the group that 
should ultimately judge the democratic legitimacy of a representative claim.  
Despite the given that the appropriate constituency is the ultimate judge for the assessment of democratic 
legitimacy, Saward still sees a role for the theorist in the process of establishing democratic 
representation. In order to recognize a representative claim as democratically legitimate, the observer 
has to assess whether it is the appropriate constituency that accepts the claim under reasonable 
conditions of judgment. It is important to emphasize that Saward conceives the role of the representative 
as purely interpretative. The theorists or observer could in no way theoretically establish the degree of 
democratic legitimacy of a representative claim before the claim has taken place. So what exactly does 
the theorist do; how might he assess the representative claim and the judgment of the constituency on 
democratic legitimacy? The observer has to carry out an interpretative investigation. It is the task of a 
theorist to interpret the acceptance of the appropriate constituency. How can the observer see if a claim 
is accepted? The accepting of a claim by the appropriate constituency is what Saward calls the 
‘acceptance act’. The theorist or observer has to look at the actual acceptance and analyse what is 
happening there.  
Now we have arrived at the second element of the definition of democratic representation: reasonable 
conditions of judgment. In order to assess the legitimacy of a representative claim, the observer must 
look at the conditions under which the appropriate constituency judges a representative claim. Saward 
claims that these conditions are the conditions of an ‘open society’ (Saward, 2010, 154). An open society 
is a society where one has the freedom to criticise or support political claims and politicians, and where 
is freedom for pluralism of values and ideas. Examples of institutions and practices that occur in such 
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an open society are free and fair elections, freedom of expression and alternative information sources. 
Saward claims that an open society is important firstly because it enables the appropriate constituency 
to be well informed in order to judge representative claims. Secondly, it facilitates and informs the 
observer to investigate the assessment of the representative claim (Saward, 2010, 155). To summarize,  
Saward understands democratic legitimacy as the acceptance of a claim by the appropriate constituency 
under reasonable conditions of judgment. For the observer to recognize a representative claim judged 
as democratically legitimate, he or she has to interpret which citizens exactly completed the acceptance 
act; is there sufficient evidence for the acceptance or rejection of a claim. The interpretation is also 
aimed at the conditions under which the representative claim is judged by the appropriate constituency 
and the judgment of the appropriate constituency is assessed by the observer. In this, Saward 
distinguishes two views on democratic legitimation. On one hand, the procedural temporal view of 
democratic legitimation that conceives of democratic legitimation as  a “specifically situated state of 
affairs whereby an instance of representation is regarded as democratically acceptable by, or is not 
rejected by an appropriate constituency” (Saward, 2014, 733). On the other hand, there is the substantive 
snapshot view that approaches democratic legitimacy as “a specific normative standard derived from a 
context-independent theory of legitimacy…” (Saward, 2014, 733). When investigating an instance of 
democratically legitimate representation, Saward argues, we need to consider both views. So he 
incorporates the two views in his account of democratically legitimate representation: “democratic 
legitimation of representation concerns ongoing acceptance of representative claims by specific 
appropriate constituencies (the procedural-temporal) under certain conditions (the substantive 
snapshot)” (Saward, 2014, 733). These ‘certain conditions’ are the conditions of the open society 
according to which the theorists should asses democratic representation. The interpretative task of the 
theorists is to investigate these conditions of the open society that are derived from a context-
independent theory of legitimacy. The procedural-temporal view of democratic representation is linked 
to the role of the constituency and the representative. They are the motors of the dynamic process of 
making, accepting and rejecting claims. Now that Saward’s account of democratic legitimacy has been 
set out, we can continue and address the main question of this chapter: what, if any, normative 
implications for the representative follow from Saward’s account of democratic legitimacy? So far we 
have discussed the general representative claim, democratic principles and democratic legitimacy. These 
are theoretical standpoints which we will use for our investigation.  
 
2.4 Saward’s account of democratic representation: a critique  
Lisa Disch also looked into the question of democratic legitimacy and the representative claim. In “The 
‘Constructivist Turn’ in Democratic Representation: A Normative Dead-End?” she detects a severe 
problem in Saward’s argument for democratically legitimate representation. She argues that Saward’s 
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commitment to the criteria of the open society as the reasonable conditions of judgment causes a retreat 
from his constructivist epistemology that the citizen is the ultimate judge (Disch, 2015, 496). Lisa Disch 
rightly notes that  Saward’s commitment to the conditions of the open society is inconsistent with his 
procedural-temporal view of democratic legitimacy. She provides two reasons for this inconsistency. 
Firstly, the appropriate constituency is no longer the ultimate judge of the representative claim. When 
the constituency judges a claim as democratically legitimate and the conditions of the open society are 
not fulfilled, the judgment of the constituency is no longer sufficient for the determination of democratic 
representation. It is the judgment of the observing theorists that is decisive. In this case, the theorists 
will conclude that the criteria for reasonable conditions of judgment are not met and hence the judgement 
of the appropriate constituency is not decisive. Secondly, this means that the theorist assesses the 
representative claim and determines democratically legitimate representation on the basis of a context-
independent standard. This is exactly the kind of approach to democratic legitimacy that Saward wanted 
to avoid. He wants democratic legitimacy to be dependent on the judgment of the constituency and not 
on the theorist. So, Disch concludes that Saward opposes his claim that the citizen is the ultimate judge 
by spelling out the conditions of the open society for the assessment by the theorist  (Disch, 2015, 496). 
Thus Saward’s account of democratic legitimacy is inconsistent with his constructivist epistemology. 
Disch concludes it is a normative dead-end (Disch, 2015, 487). However, I will argue that Saward’s 
normative standard for democratic representation is not completely a normative-dead end. But only a 
normative dead-end with regard to implications for the representative. 
I side with Disch’s critique and here I will bolster her argument by pointing out another case of 
inconsistency between Saward’s procedural-temporal view and the substantive snapshot view of  
democratic legitimacy. My critique is directed at the role of the democratic principles in the democratic 
acceptability of a representative claim. Earlier I have set out the relevance of democratic principles for 
the democratic strength of a claim. When a claim enacts democratic principles, the democratic 
acceptability of the representative claim increases. The presence of democratic principles in the claim 
can be assessed against the connecting criteria, confirming criteria and criteria of untaintedness. This 
implies that when a claim does not follow these democratic principles, it can suffer a decline in the 
degree of democratic acceptability and will not be accepted by the appropriate constituency, the ultimate 
judge of democratic legitimacy. In this sense, the democratic principles are important for the democratic 
acceptability and eventually for the democratic legitimacy of a claim. These democratic principles can 
be understood as an independent normative standard for the acceptability of a claim. However, the 
acceptance of the representative claim by the appropriate constituency is the ultimate and only judgment 
that determines the democratic legitimacy of the representative claim. How are to these two principles 
compatible? On the one hand, there are the context-independent democratic principles that contribute to 
the democratic degree of a claim. On the other, there is the idea that in the end only the judgement of 
the appropriate constituency determines the democratic legitimacy.  
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So let us for now assume that these democratic principles do not cause any problems with the 
constructivist epistemology and indeed contribute to the degree of democratic legitimacy of a claim. Do 
the democratic principles imply anything about the duties of the democratic political representative? Let 
us see if we can get clarity on this when we try to formulate a concrete normative claim, derived from 
one of the democratic principles, about the representative. For this investigation, I use the democratic 
principle of identification. Saward does not really elaborate on the details of the democratically desirable 
principles but the principles of identification roughly require the representative and represented to be 
identical in one kind of way. The identification can be present in identical interests, characteristics or 
composition. Elective representation claims can enact these principles but, Saward argues, it also has 
limits. Elected representatives always highlight selective aspects of its constituents. These representative 
claims focus only on partial identities, interest etc. This means that all the others parts of the constituents’ 
identity and interests are not represented. Secondly, Saward also notes that our interests are constantly 
changing and an elected representative can, because of the periodical elections, not act according those 
changes. As such, the enactment of the principle of identification is limited (Saward, 2009, 5). The point 
Saward wants to make is that non-elected representatives can also enact the democratic principle of 
identification. The next question is how the unelected representative’s claims should be assessed. As I 
have set out earlier, the non-elective representative claims can be assessed against three criteria. The 
democratic principles run through these criteria. How does the principle of identification run through 
the criteria? The democratic principle of identification works through the criteria of untaintedness. I will 
elaborate a bit more on the criteria of untaintedness to make clear how it is connected to the principle of 
identification. After this we can continue our attempt to formulate normative implications.  
The criteria of untaintedness are directed at the position of the representative to see whether it is 
independent of electoral institutions. Being independent of the structure of electoral institutions means 
being free from the limits the electoral structure causes. Being untainted opens up possibilities to 
represent those constituents and interests that are excluded from elective representation. “It is not so 
untaintedness in itself we are interested in here, but rather representative claims which may invoke 
interests which, along the lines of my earlier discussion, are marginalised or excluded under the present 
structure or operation of electoral politics in a certain context” (Saward, 2009, 19). Saward draws up the 
criteria along the lines of questions which we saw in the earlier discussion. The first question here is: 
“is the claim acceptable precisely because it is untainted by formal election processes?”. Also, “Is the 
claim acceptable precisely because it is untainted by virtue of disconnection from a state apparatus?” 
(Saward, 2009, 19). Saward’s line of thought is that the state and its institutions are linked to electoral 
processes. Hence the state faces the same limits in representing its constituents as elections. Would-be 
representatives outside state institutions are very well able to represent the voices and interests that are 
misrepresented by the state. So now we know what the criteria of untaintedness contain, I will point out 
how the democratic principle of identification runs through these criteria. The criteria of untaintedness 
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demand that a claim is untainted by formal election processes and disconnected from a state apparatus. 
Only then the representative is able to represent the partial and specific interests or identity of the 
constituency. Here we see a link with the principle of identification, because the principle of 
identification also aims at the representation of specific interests. Secondly, when a representative claim 
meets the criteria of untaintedness, it avoids the caveat of elected or state representation with regard to 
identification; claiming to represent a very broad spectrum of interests and the inability to adjust in 
between elections. So here I have argued how the principle of identification runs through the criteria of 
untaintedness. This is relevant to recognize, because when we want to assess the democratic degree of 
a claim, in other words the enactment of the principle of identification, we need to know how the 
evaluative test runs and how the criteria can support our answer.   
Does the principle of identification evaluated against the criteria of untaintedness give rise to any 
normative implications for the representative? One could argue that a representative should represent 
partial interests. Or at least, should be able to represent partial interests. Or that a democratically 
legitimate representative should in some sense be identical to its constituency. But this kind of context-
independent criteria are exactly the kind of criteria Saward claims to avoid. They function as an 
independent normative standard on the basis of which representation claims can be judged. The 
acceptance act of the appropriate constituency is no longer decisive in the assessment of democratic 
legitimacy when the theorist judges the claim and conditions differently than the constituency. The 
observer or theorist looks at the list of criteria for the representative and assesses the representative claim 
from a theoretical perspective. The judgment of the constituency is subservient and no longer decisive. 
Thus, here we see that we can hold a similar critique, like the one against the ‘open society’ condition, 
also against Saward’s commitment to democratic principles. The context-independent democratic 
principles conflict with the constructivist epistemology. But I claim that Disch focusses too much on 
Saward’s commitment to the constructivist epistemology. As such, she conceives any commitment to 
context-independent criteria as an inconsistency. I argue that the inconsistency is not an inconsistency 
per definition between the procedural-temporal view and the substantive snapshot view as Disch 
suggests. It is not per se an inconsistency because of the ontological status of the conflicting criteria but 
because of the content of the criteria and in particular the norm that the citizen is the ultimate judge. The 
specific conditions of the democratic principles from the substantive-snapshot view undermine the very 
demanding claim in terms of the procedural-temporal view that the citizen is the ultimate judge and 
actually has to accept. Saward does not succeed in formulating normative criteria that do not conflict 
with the condition that the citizen is the ultimate judge. If the temporal-procedural normative criterion 
would be less demanding like the absence of objection, then the normative implications about the 
representative would be less problematic. Also, the substantive snapshot criteria on themselves do not 
normatively imply something for the representative. For example, an open society is a society where 
one has the freedom to criticise or support political claims and politicians, and where is freedom for 
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pluralism of values and ideas. I claim it is not possible to argue that the representative has a role to play 
in the securement of the conditions of the open society. If it would the duty of the political representative 
to secure for example the freedom of speech, the activities of the representative would reach beyond 
what Saward understands by representation: a claim making process where constituencies accept or 
reject claims made by would-be representatives. So, it is not possible to derive consistent normative 
claims about the role of the representative because of the demanding claim that appropriate constituency 
has to be the ultimate judge.  
In short, in this chapter I have set out Michael Saward’s account of the representative claim. After that 
I have introduced Saward’s standard for democratic representation along the lines of the democratic 
principles and elaborated on his dual account of democratically legitimate representation: the 
procedural-temporal view and the substantive-snapshot view. I asked the question: what, if any, 
normative implications for the representative follow from this argument for democratic representation? 
I sided with the critique of Lisa Disch that Saward’s account of democratic legitimacy contains an 
inconsistency with regard to his dual view on democratic representation. I defended this position by 
providing a second case that proves the inconsistency in Saward’s argument. My attempt to derive a 
normative claim for the representative resulted in either an insurmountable inconsistency with the 
temporal-procedural claim that the citizen is the ultimate judge. So Saward’s account of democratic 
legitimacy normatively claims that the represented should be the ultimate judge. But this claim blocks 
the possibility of formulating normative claims about the representative. After this analysis of Saward’s 
account of democratically legitimate representation, I conclude that he does not succeed in solving the 
normative challenge of providing a complete and convincing alternative normative standard. And in the 
current political state we need a consistent and complete account of democratic representation to avoid 
that the citizens turn into puppets of the representatives who have the freedom and the means to pursue 
their own interests.  
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Chapter 3 Lisa Disch: bridging the gap 
The second constructivist author I address in this thesis is Lisa Disch. In the previous chapter I referred 
to her critique against Saward. Here I will elaborate on her position in the constructivist turn and on her 
response to the normative challenge faced by the constructivist turn. I think her analysis of the practice 
of politics in modern democracies is very accurate. Also, it is of interest to address Disch because her 
constructivist turn turns in a different direction than Saward´s. In her reading of Pitkin, she demonstrates 
important nuances in the argumentation of Pitkin overlooked by Saward. As such, her normative 
standard is build on a different foundation than Saward, might overcome the problems faced by Saward. 
In this chapter I will start with the empirical findings that triggered Disch’s constructivist position and 
the dilemma that follows from these observations. Next, I will demonstrate her reading of Pitkin and 
arguments for Pitkin’s “own constructivist turn”. This constructivist turn in Pitkin gives rise to what 
Disch terms a ‘mobilization conception’ of representation. The mobilization conception of 
representation demands an alternative normative standard to judge representation: reflexivity. Lastly, I 
will pose the question which if any normative implications about the duties of the representative follow 
from reflexivity. I will conclude that also Disch’s normative standard cannot answer the research 
question.   
 
3.1 The dilemma of democratic competence 
The starting point of Lisa Disch’s constructivism is the empirical observation that “citizen’s capacity to 
form preferences depends on the self-interested communications of elites” (Disch, 2011: 101). Disch 
argues that this finding is incompatible with two democratic principles. The first principle is what Disch 
terms the “bedrock norm”: the idea that democratic representation should take the preferences of the 
citizens as basis. It contains the idea that representatives should reflect or reproduce the interests and 
opinions of the represented. The empirical finding that preferences are context-dependent challenges the 
bedrock norm. The empirical description of the formation process of preferences does not see 
preferences as pre-existing entities but as constituted in the process of representation. So the empirical 
finding on preference formation counters the bedrock norm. The second democratic principle that does 
not cohere with the empirical observation stems from the discourse theory of democracy. This theory 
distinguishes between two types of doing politics. The first type of doing politics consists of non-
coercive and rational communicative action and of non-coercive and rational education. (Disch, 2011, 
101). On the other hand there is strategic action and manipulation, which is linked with situations where 
power is at stake and to unexpressed motives pursuing their for own advantages at the expense of the 
others. According to Disch, empirical research also shows that political communication involves both 
types of doing politics: education and manipulation. “elite discourse serves at once to inform potential 
voters and to recruit them into winning majority” (Disch, 2011: 101).  Now we have arrived at a problem 
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that Disch terms the ‘dilemma of democratic competence’. The preference formation of citizens depends 
on the communication put forward by politicians. Manipulation is intrinsic to political communication 
hence the capacity of people to form preferences at the same time makes them vulnerable to 
manipulation. This is a dilemma because the discourse theorists have the democratic intuition that in a 
representative democracy preferences must be formed deliberatively. Where power and manipulation is 
at stake, discourse theorists argue, preferences are not formed deliberatively and thus the representation 
of those preferences is undemocratic. The empirical findings show that manipulation indeed at stake. If 
the two democratic principles of responsiveness and the education/manipulation distinction cannot be 
applied to the reality of politics then what is the normative standard for democratic representation? Disch 
needs a new normative standard. To arrive at a normative standard, we first need to master Disch’s 
mobilization conception of political representation. This elaboration takes us back to Pitkin and the 
reading of Pitkin’s conception political representation by Disch.  
 
3.2 Pitkin’s ‘own constructivist turn’ 
To understand Disch’s argument we start with what Disch terms ‘Pitkin’s own constructivist turn’ 
(Disch, 2011, 107). According to Disch, many readers of Pitkin including Saward, overlook two 
constructivist elements in Pitkin’s conception of political representation. What does this ‘constructivist 
turn’ entail? The first element of the constructivist turn by Pitkin is that she rejects the dyadic principal-
agent model of representation. Disch refers to the part in The Concept of Representation where Pitkin 
puts aside the dyadic model of representation. Pitkin uses the principal-agent model to conceptually 
explain her view of political representation as substantive acting for. However, in the political reality 
we see that a political representative never represents a single individual, but almost always represents 
a constituency consisting of many more people with various interests and opinions (Pitkin 1967, 214). 
Pitkin asks herself the question whether her conceptual argument for representation formulated in terms 
of the principal-agent relationship can be applied to the political reality. Can a constituency, being an 
unorganized group, even have definite and representable interests to act for and wishes to be responsive 
to, she wonders (Pitkin, 1967, 215). The answer is ‘no’, because in Disch’s words, “legislators respond 
to too great a complexity and plurality of determinants, for citizen preferences to be a driving force in 
legislative decisions” (Disch, 2011, 106). So both Disch and Pitkin state that the principal-agent model 
of representation cannot be applied because political representation is not a one-to-one relationship 
between the representative and his constituents. As such “It is a mistake to approach political 
representation too directly from the individual-representation analogies” (Pitkin, 1967, 211). 
Consequently, Disch concludes that she and Pitkin reject the dyadic model for political representation. 
The rejection of the dyadic model of representation is the first constructivist move by Pitkin.   
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If political representation is not a principal-agent relationship, what then is political representation? The 
second constructivist move by Pitkin relates to her conception of political representation. Pitkin 
conceives of political representation as a system or a process. “Political representation is primarily a 
public, institutionalized arrangement involving many people and groups, and operating in the complex 
ways of large-scale social arrangements” (Pitkin, 1967, 221). This arrangement emerges from an over-
all political system of “multiple activities of many people” (Pitkin, 1967, 222). Political representation 
is not established in a single action, in a one-to-one relationship as the principal-agent model prescribes. 
In this structural conception of political representation we see what Disch calls the second element of 
“Pitkin’s own constructivist turn”. Political representation is a construction in the sense that it is 
constituted by various political activities of many people. Disch emphasizes the condition for legitimate 
representation: the process is representative if the represented have the ability “to object to what is done 
in their name” and they do not object (Disch, 2011, 107). Disch refers to this criterion as the non-
objection criterion. It requires that the represented is “capable of action and judgment, but in such a wat 
that he does not object to what is done in his name” (Pitkin, 1967, 155). Next to the non-objection 
criterion, Disch adds another condition: the represented should be capable of judgment and action 
(Disch, 2011, 107). This is what she terms the  ‘judgement clause’. Disch introduces the judgment clause 
to ensure that the represented are capable of judgment and objection. The judgment clause precedes the 
non-objection criterion.    
Disch reads a radical element in Pitkin’s conception of political representation. Radical in the sense that 
representation mobilizes constituencies. Earlier we saw that Pitkin argues that political representation 
involves acting for an unorganized group with various interests and wishes. How can such a diverse 
group have representable interests? Pitkin gives an answer: “politics entails the reconciliation of 
conflicting claims” (Pitkin, 1967, 218). Out of the conflicting claims politics creates a compromise, a 
compromise which can be represented. For example, the interests and opinions of the national unity are 
created through the process of political representation: “the national unity is also continually re-created 
by the representatives’ activities ” (Pitkin, 1967, 218). Here we recognize the constructivist elements in 
Pitkin emphasized by Disch. Representation contributes to what it represents. Disch formulates this 
constructivist turn in terms of mobilization because she conceives representation as calling “forth a 
constituency by depicting it as a collective with a shared aim” (Disch, 2011, 107). She terms this view 
on representation the ‘mobilization conception of representation’. Disch adds one more constructivist 
feature to the mobilization conception of representation by claiming that representation is performative: 
“representing is an activity that produces ontological effects while seeming merely to follow from an 
existing state of affairs” (Disch, 2011, 107-108). Representations create an image of the constituency. 
Because of that image constituencies conceive of themselves as one group united in that image. And as 
such the group becomes an actual group due to the activity of representation. I think Disch rightly points 
to the differences between Pitkin’s elaboration of representation as a one-to-one relationship and 
30 
 
representation as a political process. In his critique on Pitkin, Saward does not demonstrate that he has 
taken into consideration Pitkin’s distinction between representation in terms of the conceptual principal-
agent model and representation as political representation. He seems not to have read Pitkin’s chapter 
Political Representation’ where she critically reflects on her own work and concludes that political 
representation is not a dyadic model. It is surprising that this refutation of the dyadic model by Pitkin is 
completely overlooked by Saward. Consequently, Saward also neglects Pitkin’s understanding of 
political representation as an institutionalized arrangement. Instead, he focuses only on the abstract 
formulation of representation as acting for. He reduces her specific analysis of political representation 
to the one-to-one principal- agent model of representation. Saward argues “My main argument is that 
this unidirectional approach is unnecessarily limiting. It encourages us to ignore the subtle and deeper 
processes of constructing the represented…” (Saward, 2010, 10). Also, he claims that Pitkin represents 
the constitutive aspects of representation as insignificant for democratic representation and political 
representation in general (Saward, 2010, 12-13). Saward’s reading of Pitkin clearly opposes Disch’s 
constructivist interpretation of Pitkin. In my opinion, Disch rightly interprets Pitkin’s concept of 
representation as constructivist. Saward has not taken any of this constructivist turn into consideration. 
Saward’s own words can be held against him. It is not Pitkin who encourages us to ignore the constitutive 
aspects of representation. It is Saward himself who encourages us to ignore the ‘constructivist turn’ of 
Pitkin.  
Until this point Disch and Pitkin are on the same page. But when addressing the normative question of 
representation, Disch blames Pitkin for retreating from the mobilization conception of representation 
and returning to the unidirectional understanding of representation. Disch argues that this retreat is 
caused by what Disch terms the ‘etymological protocol’ : re-presentation, making present again (Disch, 
2011, 109). Pitkin argues that “as the ‘re’ in ‘representation’ seems to suggest, and as I have argued in 
rejecting the fascist model of representation, the represented must somehow be logically prior: the 
representative must be responsive to him rather than the other way around” (Pitkin, 1967, 140). Disch 
criticizes Pitkin for returning to the two democratic principle we saw at the beginning of this chapter 
and that do not cohere with the empirical findings: the bedrock norm of representation and the distinction 
between education and manipulation. So according to Disch, the etymological protocol causes Pitkin’s 
retreat from constructivist turn. Representation as making present again must reflect or reproduce the 
represented. If it does not, it is not democratic representation. Disch proposes an alternative 
interpretation of “re-presentation”. She reasons that representation can also be defined as an activity of 
making present and not  making present again. Representation is not a reflection but “an activity that 
creates its own reference points” (Disch, 2011, 109). The ‘re’ in ‘representation’ can also be an iterative 
‘re’ of repetition. When representation is understood in the iterative sense, representation does not have 
to reflect something and as such it is not bound by the unidirectionality of responsiveness.  
Representation as making present rhymes with the empirical findings that citizen’s preferences are 
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formed by their context and representatives because here representation makes the represented present 
by a creative activity and not by a reflection of something prior. By repudiating Pitkin’s etymological 
protocol, Disch stands for a normative challenge that is in line with representation in the iterative sense 
and that does not requires pre-existing preferences and interests. The standard normative account of 
congruence between the representative and represented in terms of preferences does not do the job here, 
because congruence assumes that there are pre-existing preferences/ interests that should be represented 
by the representatives. Empirical findings show that political representation is both orientated to 
recruiting supporters by both education as well as and changing the voters’ ideas and beliefs by 
anticipating on emotions. If this is how political representation occurs, is manipulation in representation 
inevitable? Is it possible to distinguish between political communication and political elites 
manipulating the people?  
3.3 Encouraging contestation 
According to Disch, the criterium for democratic representation is reflexivity. Considering the fact that 
Disch conceives of political representation as an institutionalized arrangement, reflexivity is the capacity 
of a system (Disch, 2011, 111). Representation processes not only take place within governmental 
institutions but also throughout society in, for example, interests groups and media. So reflexivity as the 
standard for democratic representation also applies to non-elected representation. What criteria should 
a representation process meet in order to be reflexive? A representation process is reflexive when it 
encourages contestation. Disch understands contestation to include three elements. First, representation 
is always contestable because no representative can completely and absolutely represent a people. 
Secondly, the represented must have the communicative means and means of action to contest the 
representing body. Lastly, the different kinds of political communication in society, media, opinion 
shapers, political parties etc, must be in competition with each other to lower the risk that a representative 
group dominates society. Next to the encouragement of contestation, reflexive representation requires 
an institutional arrangement that is able to constantly take into account the objections (Disch, 2011, 
111). 
Disch sketches a constitutional design for reflexivity from which she extracts three principles (Disch, 
2011, 111-112). The first principle entails that reflexive institutions are interlocking so that decisions 
made by one institution effect the others. Consequently, the involved institutions review the decisions 
or actions which will result in . Secondly, reflexive institutions broaden the scope of conflict. By 
broadening the scope of conflict, more and more participants take part in the debate and can judge and 
object. That triggers reconsideration and results in an outcome that is prone to be well reasoned. Thirdly, 
any statement of the popular will can always be contested by anyone, because in the constitutional design 
all positions have equal right to call for reconsideration.. The three principle ensure that no one is 
privileged and that everyone can object.  
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3.5. Reflexivity and the duties of the political representative  
Now we are familiar with Disch’s conception of representation and her normative standard, we can 
focus on the research question of this thesis. We have also seen that her normative standard for political 
representation is primarily fit for judging representation as a process. However, we are interested in the 
specific duties of the representative in that process. What does the normative standard of reflexivity 
imply for the role and duties of the political representative? Before we attempt to answer this question, 
we need to take a step back and ask ourselves a deeper rooted question: is Disch’s normative standard 
consistent with the constructivist epistemology? We have come across this question before in the critique 
against Saward. The critique of an inconsistent epistemology now needs to be held against Disch’s 
normative standard. Is Disch’s argument for reflexivity also subjected to the argument that the 
democratic norm is inconsistent with the constructivist epistemology? I argue it is not. Disch’s 
normative standard of reflexivity is not susceptible to the critique of inconsistency with regard to the 
constructivist epistemology for two reasons.  
Basically, Disch’s account of democratic representation strives to the same idea as Saward’s account: 
for democratic representation the judgment of the represented is decisive. We saw that Saward’s 
democratic norm entails that the represented actually accepts or rejects. But Disch’s aim is more modest. 
Her account does not require the actual acceptance of the represented but only that the represented are 
able to object and do object when they disagree with what is done in their name. To ensure this Disch 
relies on the normative standard of reflexivity. Different than Saward’s reliance on the conditions of the 
open society that undermine the ultimate judgment of represented, the standard of reflexivity does not 
undermine the capability of the represented to judge and act. If we conceive of Disch’s account of 
democratic representation in terms of Saward’s dual view on democratic legitimacy, we can see how 
Disch succeeds in being consistent where Saward fails. The non-objection criterion can be understood 
as the procedural-temporal view on democratic legitimacy. Reflexivity as the context-independent 
substantive-snapshot view. The principles that follow from reflexivity, interlocking institutions, 
broadening the scope of conflict and the equal right to call for consideration are in that sense independent 
criteria. But they do not undermine the non-objection criterion. The criteria of reflexivity do not interfere 
with the capacity of the represented to object and act. That the assessment of the conditions require a 
theoretical investigation by a theorist, does not harm the non-objection criterion because the non-
objection criterion does not imply the actual and ultimate acceptance only by the represented. As such, 
the judgment of the theorist is compatible with the non-objection criterion. We have seen that with 
Saward that the judgment of the theorist on the basis on independent criteria undermine his own claim 
that the represented is the ultimate judge. So the criteria of the procedural-temporal view and the 
substantive-snapshot view are consistent. The second argument for the consistency of Disch’s normative 
standard relies on an argument made by Disch in her article “The “Constructivist Turn” in Democratic 
Representation: A Normative Dead-End?”. In this article she formulates the critique against Saward 
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concerning his commitment to the context-independent conditions of the open society. “Ultimately, 
Saward does retreat from his constructivist epistemology by spelling out independent criteria of 
legitimacy. But he need not have”. He need not have, Disch argues, because the solution for the 
inconsistency between the context-independent conditions and the role of the represented is already 
present in his construction of the representative claim: the citizen standpoint. What is the citizen 
standpoint? To understand the citizen standpoint we shortly go back to Saward’s representative claim 
and his account of democratic representation. “A maker of representations puts forward a subject which 
stands for an object that is related to a referent and is offered to an audience”(Saward, 2010, 37). The 
citizen standpoint is a standpoint from which both the citizen and the observer can perform a critical 
analysis. This analysis contains an empirical and critical investigation of the images of the objects put 
forward by the claim makes. The citizen standpoint also investigates which images or ideas succeed and 
have effect on policy outcomes, and what resources are used when putting forward the images. From 
the citizen standpoint the observer can pay “detailed attention to the conditions under which the claims 
are made, received and assessed” (Saward, 2010, 147). This empirical approach assesses the power 
relations that condition the representative claim. From this standpoint it is possible to judge a 
representative claim and to judge whether the claim has been accepted by the appropriate constituency 
and, most importantly, whether it has been accepted under reasonable conditions of judgment. From the 
critical empirical citizen standpoint, the conditions of judgment can be assessed by the citizens 
themselves. There is no need for an assessment by a theorist that might overrule the judgment of the 
represented, the involved citizens. So the assessment of the conditions of the ‘open society’ is 
compatible with the constructivist epistemology. The critical analysis from the citizen standpoint shows 
that the substantive-snapshot criteria do not undermine the procedural-temporal view of democratic 
legitimacy. The procedural-temporal view and the substantive-snapshot view of democratic legitimacy 
do not conflict. To conclude, at least Disch’s normative standard of reflexivity is a consistent account 
of democratic representation. It’s conditions do no undermine each other. Whether Disch’s normative 
standard is compelling will depend on whether it address the  normative question of the role of the 
representative. What, if any, normative implications follow from reflexivity for the role and duty of the 
representative? In other words, we are addressing the question whether the principles of reflexivity can 
be applied to and formed in accordance with  the role and duties of the representative.  
We have seen three principles that follow from reflexivity; interlocking institutions, institutions that 
broaden the scope of conflict, and institutions that do not give one position an advantage over the other 
when contesting the public will. Let us address the principles one by one to critically analyse if they can 
normatively imply something about the role and duties of the political representative. The first principle 
of interlocking institutions is formulated specifically in terms of institutions so that it has no implications 
for the role of the representative. The second principle, broaden the scope of conflict, is also a dead end. 
Claiming that the representative should broaden the scope of conflict does not secure democratic 
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representation. For example, broadening the scope of conflict might be part of a political strategy in the 
game for more support. So broadening the conflict is not an action that distinguishes democratic 
representation from non-democratic representation. For the third principle of reflexivity, institutions that 
do not give one position an advantage over the other when contesting the public will, the same  argument 
applies as for the first principle: it is only applicable to the design of an institution. So it is not possible 
to discern a role for the representative in those institutions. Also, securing that any statement of the 
popular will can be called into question by anyone, is not a task that can be dictated to the representative, 
I say. Having the responsibility for equality amongst the people falls outside the limits of what 
understand when speaking about representation. In short,  these three principles cannot be applied to the 
representative because all principles approach representation as a process whereby political 
representation emerges from the ongoing dynamic between the represented and the representative. 
However, there seems to be one exception. There is one comment by Disch that hints at a specific duty 
of the representative. We saw that reflexivity required more than only the encouragement of 
contestation. It also requires an infrastructure in which “… representatives must have regular, structured 
ways of taking objections into account”. This claim counts “For a system as for an individual”(Disch, 
2011, 111). In the case of a governmentally representative body, Disch argues that “reflexivity would 
require provision for a formal response that at least registers … popular challenges” (Disch, 2011, 111). 
In other words, she says that representatives, both in the sense of bodies and individuals, must at least 
constantly receive the objections and take them into account but not necessarily obey them. This sounds 
very familiar to what Pitkin means by ‘responsiveness’ : “the representative must always and continually 
be ready and able to respond” (Pitkin, 1967, 22). Responsiveness also involves that the representative 
owes his constituency an explanation when he does not act according their objections.  Disch requires a 
same sort of responsiveness. The representative must be responsive towards the objections of his 
constituency.   
Does Disch hint at an unidirectionality here which she so fiercely rejected earlier on? Should the 
representative be responsive to the represented and not the other way around? It might seem like it, but 
I argue that this does not bring us back to the unidirectionality of the ‘bedrock norm’. Moreover, I think 
we should understand her responsiveness an attempt to introduce reciprocity rather than 
unidirectionality. Disch’s responsiveness only requires “regular, structured ways of taking objections 
into account.” ( Disch, 2011, 111). These structured ways contribute to the capacity of the represented 
to judge and act. It puts the represented in a position in which it is able to defend itself against the  
subjection of the representative claims put forward by the representatives. So with responsiveness Disch 
wants to establish a balanced representation process where the represented and the representatives 
mutually influence each other. The effect is not unidirectionality but reciprocity. The representative 
influences the represented in the opinion formation process. The represented has the capacity to 
influence the representative. So Disch’s normative standard of reflexivity implies that it is the role of 
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the representative to take objections into account without reliance on the bedrock norm. However, this 
condition contains an ambiguity with regard to its application on the individual representative. On the 
one hand, she says that both the individual and the system should have a structured ways of taking 
objections into account. On the other hand she says “In the case of unofficial or “self-appointed” 
representatives, reflexivity is difficult to mandate but could be observed in the representative’s response 
to challenges to his or her reputation…” ( Disch, 2011, 111).  Now reflexivity seems to have become a 
descriptive tool rather than a normative standard. Disch says here that we can observe reflexivity but 
not mandate it. Also, what kind of structures for considering objections should we think of in the case 
of a ‘self-appointed’ individual representative? The point of the ‘self-appointed’ representative is that 
he is not bound by formal institutions and organizations. Disch does not give an answer to that question 
and even if we had an answer, it would be “difficult to mandate”. We can conclude that reflexivity as 
the normative standard for democratic representation gives us no definite answer on the role and duties 
of the representative in democratic representation.  
In short, we became familiar with Disch’s constructivist approach that bridges the alleged gap between 
Pitkin and Saward. Also, Disch criticizes Pitkin for her fallback on the unidirectionality of the 
etymological protocol ‘making present again’. As an alternative, Disch proposes to understand 
representation as making present. This alternative protocol asks for an alternative normative standard. 
Reflexivity as the normative standard for democratic representation proposed by Disch, is consistent 
with the constructivist epistemology but the principles of reflexivity are only applicable for judging 
representation as a process. As such they do not provide us any claims on the role of the representative 
within the representative process. There is one exception. Disch does leave us with one ambiguous duty 
for the representative: responsiveness towards objections.  
 
Conclusion 
We discussed three different positions on democratic representation and investigated each one of them 
to analyse what, if anything, they normatively imply for the duties of the political representative. We 
saw that Pitkin argues that the representative must be responsive to his constituents. He should perform 
in such a way that the represented does not object to what is done in his name. However, her argument 
is not the definite answer to the question of the duties of the representative. The problem with her account 
is that it cannot account for political representation outside formal and governmental institutions. That 
is problematic because, as Rehfeld and Montanaro showed, we need to be able to address the political 
reality  outside governmental institutions. The constructivist turn in political representation is able to 
address all the forms of political representation. Next we investigated Saward’s constructivist position. 
Saward criticizes Pitkin for what he takes to be, ‘her unidirectional approach on representation’. Saward 
argues that political representation itself is constructed and that political representation contributes to 
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the creation of what it represents. Saward understands political representation in terms of the 
‘representative claim’ that also enables the analysis of political representation outside governmental 
institutions. However, Saward’s dual account of democratic representation fails to provide normative 
claims about the duty and the role of the representative, because the assessment of the conditions of the 
open society undermine the role of the citizen as the ultimate judge. Thirdly, we saw that Disch embraces 
Saward’s constructivist view and the representative claim. We also learned that Disch’s reading of Pitkin 
is much more accurate than Saward’s and that Disch does not reduces Pitkin’s account of representation 
to the standard account of representation. Disch recognizes in a constructivist turn in Pitkin’s account 
and she sides with Pitkin’s conception of political representation as the product of an over-all structure. 
Still, Disch takes her commitment to the constructivist conception of representation a step further than 
Pitkin and repudiates Pitkin’s etymological protocol of making present again. The new etymological 
protocol asks for a new normative standard. Disch continues along the line of Pitkin’s non-objection 
criterion and develops a normative standard in terms of encouragement of contestation via institutions. 
Consequently her normative standard is only applicable to political representation as a process, hence is 
not suited to provide normative implications for the representative within that process. I conclude that 
the three positions do not provide us with satisfying information on the role and the duties of the 
representative in modern audience democracy.  
There are two more lessons to be drawn from this analysis. They  explain the absence of an answer and 
show that Pitkin, Saward and Disch share important common grounds. Firstly, I argue that all three 
authors on an fundamental level share the same basic approach to representation. Pitkin, Saward and 
Disch conceive of political representation not as a dyadic relationship but as a construction that arises 
from an over-all structure. We saw that Pitkin defines representation as an institutionalized arrangement. 
The over-all structure and functioning of that arrangement is what it makes representative. Political 
representation consists of “the patterns emerging from the multiple activities of many people” (Pitkin, 
1967,  221-222). Disch shares this idea with Pitkin. Likewise, Saward claims that “representation is in 
large measure a product of representative claims” (Saward, 2010, 18). Thus, the three authors share the 
basal assumption that political representation is the product of an interactive process whether or not 
structured by (in)formal institutions. So Saward is wrong in posing such a strong opposition between 
Pitkin and the constructivist turn while in fact they have a common ground. This conclusion has 
important consequences. It forces us to look critically into  the research question: what, if any, normative 
implications follow from the constructivist account of political representation concerning the duties of 
the representative? The formulation of the question suggests that at least there is something meaningful 
to say about an individual element in the process political of representation. But we just concluded that 
Pitkin, Disch and Saward conceive of political representation as the product of a whole process. Pitkin’s 
conceptual argument in terms of the principal-agent relationship, formulates responsiveness for the 
individual. But this conceptual formulation cannot be applied to political representation. That leaves us 
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with the other two constructivist approaches. For Saward and Disch counts, if normative claims can be 
derived, the claims are only applicable to political representation as a whole and to institutionalised 
representation, but not to the individual parts  the process consists of. It could be argued that our research 
question is formulated in such a way that from the very beginning it was deemed to get a negative 
answer. However, this is not the case. I argue that the account of political representation as a construction 
lacks the capability to provide a normative account that can address the question of the duties for the 
democratic representative. Besides the fact that this account is incomplete, the constructivist turn fails 
its own ambition to develop an useful theory in line with the political reality. Amongst other 
constructivist authors, Saward claims that the goal of the constructivist turn is “to enable the theory to 
be useful, to illuminate what is going on around us.” (Saward, 2010, 33). In this regards, it fails because 
it cannot provide us with the tools to judge the representative acts performed in the daily practice.  
Next to the finding that Pitkin, Saward and Disch fundamentally share the same constructivist approach 
to political representation, there is a second finding. The second finding I derive from the analysis in 
this thesis is that all three accounts of democratic representation see a prominent role for the condition 
that the represented must be capable to judge and act. As we have seen, Pitkin was the first who 
formulated the non-objection criterion. The representative must promote the interests of the represented 
but in such a way that the represented “do not object to what is done in their name.” (Pitkin, 1967, 155). 
This condition runs parallel to another more fundamental condition: the represented must be capable of 
action and judgment. Consider the following example demonstrated by Pitkin: if we think of the 
represented as a helpless child and incapable of action, as being taken care of, then we will not speak of 
representation (Pitkin, 1967, 155). Disch complements this line of thought and adds the ‘judgment 
clause’: the condition of the represented being capable of action. Without the fulfilment of the judgment 
clause, the wishes and objections cannot be taken into consideration. Both Pitkin and Disch argue that 
there must be a structure that secures the constant possibility for the objections to be taken into 
consideration. Also Saward’s account of democratic representation includes the condition that the 
represented should be able of action and judgment. He takes it a step further and argues that democratic 
representation does not just require the absence of objections but actual “evidence of sufficient 
acceptance of claim” (Saward, 2010, 145).  He says that “Pitkin’s non-objection principle is an important 
root of this point” (Saward, 2014, 733). Saward’s condition is more demanding compared to Pitkin and 
Disch in the sense that it not only requires the possibility or encouragement of objection, but also 
requires actual objection or acceptance. Similarly, Disch also takes the non-objection criterion further 
than Pitkin but not as demanding as Saward. She argues that the institutional design should not only 
make the capacity to act possible but should also actively encourage it. I conclude that Disch’s and 
Saward’s conditions for the capacity of the represented are derivatives from Pitkin’s nonobjection 
criterion. Thus they share the idea that democratic representation depends on the capacity of the 
represented to act and object. Their arguments for democratic representation provide a clear vision on 
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the role of represented in the process of representation but not on the representative. If the question had 
been: ‘What, if anything, does the constructivist account of political representation normatively claim 
about the represented?’ we would have had an answer. But, I conclude, that for our research question 
‘What, if anything, does the constructivist account of political representation normatively claim about 
the duties of the political representative?’ we do not get such clear answers. Is this problematic? On the 
one hand I would call this problematic, because the constructivist turn does not give a full account of 
democratic representation that we can use when judging daily practices of political representation where 
representatives have an important role in the spotlights. The constructivist turn itself argued that the 
theory of political representation should be less remote from the political reality. It does not succeed in 
fully responding to the normative challenge. On the other hand, I think the general effect of the 
constructivist turn as we discussed here is the strengthening of the position of the represented. That is 
crucial in modern ‘audience democracies’ where social media and other multimedia are used by potential 
representatives to influence the ideas and opinions of potential supporters. The capacity of the 
represented to judge and act is now extra important. But in the attempt to strengthen the position of the 
represented, the constructivist turn overlooks the importance of clarity on the duties of the actors who 
professionalised the activity of influencing opinion formation: the political representative. 
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